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ABSTRACT 
Information about the opponent is essential to improve automated 
negotiation strategies for bilateral multi-issue negotiation. In this 
paper we propose a negotiation strategy that combines a Bayesian 
technique to learn the preferences of an opponent during bidding 
and a Tit-for-Tat-like strategy to avoid exploitation by the 
opponent. The learned opponent model is used to achieve two 
important goals in negotiation. It may be used to increase the 
efficiency of negotiation by searching for Pareto optimal bids and 
to avoid exploitation by making moves that mirror the move of the 
other party. The performance of the proposed negotiation strategy 
is analyzed in a tournament setup. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial Intelligence 
– intelligent agents, multi-agent systems, 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Performance, Economics, Experimentation, Theory. 
Keywords 
Automated Multi-Issue Negotiation, Opponent Modelling, 
Bayesian Learning, Negotiation Strategy, Tit-for-Tat. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In bilateral negotiation, two parties aim at reaching a joint 
agreement. They do so by exchanging various offers or bids using 
e.g. an alternating offers protocol called the “negotiation dance” 
in [4]. In reaching such an agreement both parties usually aim to 
satisfy their own interests as best as possible, but have to take 
their opponent’s preferences into account as well to reach an 
agreement at all. This is complicated, by the fact that negotiating 
parties are generally not willing to reveal their preferences in 
order to avoid exploitation. As a result, both parties have 
incomplete information which makes it hard to decide on a good 
negotiation move and hard to reach an optimal agreement. 
One way to approach the problem of incomplete information is to 
learn an opponent’s preferences given the negotiation moves that 
an opponent makes during the negotiation. For example, 
negotiating agents can obtain a good approximation of an 
opponent’s preferences in a single-session negotiation by studying 
the offers made by the opponent [3]. The approach of [3] focuses 
on obtaining a correct model of the opponent’s preferences in the 
shortest time possible from as few bids as possible.  
In this paper, we propose a negotiation strategy that uses a model 
of the opponent’s preferences not only to increase the efficiency 
of the negotiated agreement but also to avoid exploitation by the 
other party in a sophisticated manner. This paper shows that two 
important goals in any negotiation can be realized when a 
reasonable estimate of the preferences of an opponent is available. 
For that purpose we combine the Bayesian learning technique as 
proposed in [3] with a Tit-for-Tat-like tactic, see e.g., [1], and the 
classification of negotiation moves as described in [2]. The 
opponent profile together with the classification scheme is used to 
develop a Tit-for-Tat Bayesian negotiation strategy, that is 
sophisticated in three ways.  
First, its bidding can be understood by the opponent as signalling 
whether a move is appreciated or not (which is not as easy as it 
seems). Second, it is a friendly strategy that does not punish the 
opponent for making a move that can be understood as an honest 
mistake. Finally, the proposed strategy is based on a rationality 
assumption, i.e., that an opponent would tend to accept more 
preferred offers over less preferred. In line with this assumption, 
the strategy searches for Pareto efficient offers, i.e., offers that 
cannot be improved for both parties simultaneously.  
2.  NEGOTIATION STRATEGY 
The ultimate goal of a negotiation strategy is to reach the most 
beneficial deal possible. Negotiation is, however, a joint decision 
requiring acceptance of an offer by the other party. Any negotiator 
thus faces a dilemma involving two conflicting goals in a 
negotiation: how to maximize the utility of an agreement for the 
agent itself and how to maximize the chance of acceptance by the 
opponent at the same time. To achieve the first goal the strategy 
proposed is based on the Tit-for-Tat-like tactic that has proved to 
be efficient in co-operative problem-solving negotiation settings 
[1]. To achieve the second goal a model of the opponent’s 
preferences that is learned during a negotiation session is used. 
The negotiation strategy assumes that a preference profile can be 
defined as a function of the evaluation functions associated with 
the individual issues. More specifically, the utility function has a 
linear additive structure. We assume that a learning technique 
used to model the opponent preferences tries to reconstruct 
original utility function representing the opponent preferences 
with an approximate function. The authors of [3] propose an 
algorithm to model opponent preferences based on the Bayesian 
learning technique. The algorithm learns the probability 
distribution over a set of hypotheses about evaluation functions 
and weights of the issues. The probability distribution defined 
over the set of hypothesis represents the agent's belief about the 
opponent's preferences. Structural assumptions about the 
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evaluation functions and weights decrease the number of 
parameters to be learned and simplify the learning task. During a 
negotiation when a new bid is received from the opponent the 
probability of each hypothesis is updated using Bayes’ rule.  
The availability of information about an opponent’s preferences 
enables an agent to make judgments about the opponent’s moves. 
A classification of negotiation moves proposed in [2] gives an 
interesting insight into the dynamic properties of agent 
negotiation behaviour. The classification of the negotiation moves 
allowed us to develop a sophisticated Tit-for-Tat tactic. The basic 
idea of Tit-for-Tat in multi-issue negotiation is to respond to an 
opponent move with a symmetrical one, as depicted in Figure 1. 
All rational negotiation strategies known to us try to make 
concession moves at some points during the negotiation. The most 
reasonable response to a concession move would be a concession 
move of approximately the same concession size. This is called 
“mirroring” the move of the opponent. 
Mirroring simply in this manner would imply that an unfortunate 
move of the opponent would be answered with an unfortunate 
step. However, it is not rational to consciously make unfortunate 
steps. Therefore, we conclude that the pure tactic by mirroring the 
opponent moves is too simplistic. Instead we use an 
approximation of the Pareto frontier computed using the learned 
opponent model and the agent’s own preference profile to add an 
additional step. The strategy thus developed is called Bayesian 
Tit-for-Tat. 
In this step after matching the opponent move according to the 
Tit-for-Tat tactic the Bayesian Tit-for-Tat strategy searches for a 
bid on the approximated Pareto frontier that is on the same iso-
curve with the matched bid, see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 -Bayesian Tit-for-Tat Strategy 
In short, we constructed the Bayesian Tit-for-Tat strategy on the 
basis of the assumption that by maximizing the opponent’s utility 
in every offer, we increase the chance of acceptance. Therefore, if 
after mirroring the opponent’s move the efficiency of our next 
move can be increased by selecting an equivalent offer (with 
respect to the agent’s preference profile) on the Pareto frontier our 
strategy will choose to make that offer. The agent accepts a bid 
from its opponent when the utility of that bid is higher than the 
utility of its own last bid or the utility of the bid it would 
otherwise propose next.  
Note, that learning the opponent preference is not perfect and 
therefore, classification of the negotiation moves can be 
imprecise. As a result, the adequacy of our strategy can only be 
established experimentally in a tournament as proposed in [2]. As 
discussed, the main objective associated with a negotiation 
strategy is to gain the best agreement possible in a negotiation. 
Utility of an agreement, therefore, measures the efficiency of a 
strategy. For every negotiation domain and preference profile the 
utility of agreements achieved by a strategy were averaged over all 
opponent strategies in the tournament. We assume that an efficient 
negotiation strategy should perform better than the Zero 
Intelligence (ZI) strategy [2]. Therefore, we calculate the 
percentage of the utility increase compared to the utility of the ZI 
strategy (see Table 1). 
Table 1 - Increase in utility relative to the ZI strategy 
ABMP Trade-Off
Bayesian
Smart
Bayesian
 Tit-for-Tat
Car 16% 12% 13% 14%
Party domain 13% 9% 13% 14%
Service Oriented 14% 17% 25% 38%
AMPO vs City 10% 13% 14% 20%
Employment contr. 11% 40% 44% 47%
Negotiation Domain
Negotiation Strategy
 
The results show that on all domains the Bayesian Tit-for-Tat 
strategy performs better than all other strategies currently 
available in the negotiation repository, except the 2
nd hand car 
negotiation domain where the ABMP strategy is very efficient. 
3.  CONCLUSIONS 
The Bayesian Tit-for-Tat strategy for closed multi-issue 
negotiation as proposed in this paper shows that two important 
goals in any negotiation can be realized when a reasonable 
estimate of the preferences of an opponent is available: to increase 
the efficiency of the negotiated agreement and to avoid 
exploitation by the other party. Our strategy combines three 
fundamental techniques: Bayesian learning, Tit-for-Tat, and the 
classification of negotiation moves as developed for the analysis 
of negotiation strategies [2]. The Bayesian technique as proposed 
in [3] is used to learn the opponent’s preferences during the 
negotiation. Tit-for-Tat, e.g., [1], is applied to avoid exploitation 
by a form of mirroring of the bids of the opponent. The opponent 
profile together with the classification scheme is used to develop a 
negotiation strategy that is sophisticated in three ways.  
Firstly, its bidding can be understood by the opponent as 
signalling whether a move is appreciated or not (Tit-for-Tat). It 
forms the basis of our aim to be transparent to the opponent. 
Secondly, it is a friendly strategy in that it does not punish the 
opponent for making a move that can be understood as an honest 
mistake. Third, using the learned opponent model our strategy 
allows an agent to propose nearly Pareto optimal offers using the 
learned opponent preferences to approximate the Pareto frontier. 
The performance of the proposed Bayesian Tit-for-Tat negotiation 
strategy has been analyzed in a tournament setup, using domains 
of different characteristics and a number of existing negotiation 
agents. The results show the Bayesian Tit-for-Tat strategy realizes 
a significant relative increase in utility with respect to the other 
strategies that were part of the tournament setup, including the 
Zero Intelligence, ABMP, Trade-Off, and Bayesian agents. 
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